From exiled royals to grassroots activists, mapping the potential architects of a post‑theocratic republic

Introduction
Imagining a secular Iran requires both courage and clarity. It means looking beyond the Islamic Republic’s barricades of ideology and into a landscape shaped by student networks, satellite TV channels, and encrypted chats that criss‑cross a fifteen‑million‑strong diaspora. If the clerical regime were to collapse—through mass protest, elite defection, or a negotiated exit—the country would wake up without an obvious head of state. Unlike the Shah in 1979, the Supreme Leader has no singular rival on the horizon, only a mosaic of contenders eager to fill the vacuum.

Exiled leadership with name recall
*Reza Pahlavi* – The son of the last Shah has transformed himself from reluctant heir to full‑time campaigner for free elections. He enjoys the widest name recognition—surveys of Persian‑language satellite viewers give him 35–40 percent favorability—but his absence from Iran since age eighteen raises doubts about his capacity to govern rather than campaign.
*Maryam Rajavi and the NCRI* – From her base outside Paris, Rajavi fronts the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political umbrella of the Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK). The group fields small but disciplined cells and a lobbying machine that courts Western legislators. Its 10‑point plan promises gender equality and secular law, yet detractors label it authoritarian.

Civil‑rights and women’s‑rights icons
*Narges Mohammadi* – Awarded the 2023 Nobel Peace Prize, Mohammadi remains in Tehran’s Evin Prison. Her writings smuggled out on cigarette wrappers frame secular democracy as the only antidote to “systemic violence.”
*Masih Alinejad* – The Brooklyn‑based journalist galvanized the #No2Hijab movement and commands digital mobilization power unparalleled among exiles. Critics claim her activism fails to address socioeconomic grievances, but her cross‑generational reach could make her a spokesperson in a provisional cabinet.

Frontrunners inside the country
*Masoud Pezeshkian* – The cardiac surgeon‑turned‑politician was elected president in 2024 on a platform of “good governance within the existing constitution.” Yet he publicly supports separating mosque and state—“a civil republic inspired by but not ruled by religion.”
*Ali Karimi* – A national football hero and vocal supporter of the 2022 protests, Karimi lacks political experience but commands visceral loyalty among working‑class youth.

Minority representation
*Abdullah Mohtadi and Kurdish parties* – Secular nationalism resonates in Iran’s peripheries, especially Kurdistan, where Komala and the KDPI have fought both the Shah and the Islamic Republic. Mohtadi favors a federal structure akin to post‑2003 Iraq.

Blueprints for transition
The most detailed roadmap so far is the “Mahsa Charter,” drafted in 2023 by a loose coalition of forty activists, including Alinejad and Hamed Esmaeilion. The charter calls for: (1) an interim council capped at two years, (2) dissolution or reform of the IRGC under parliamentary oversight, (3) a secular constitution drafted by an elected assembly.

The security dilemma
No secular transition can ignore the two coercive pillars of the current state: the IRGC and the Basij militia. Scenarios range from negotiated amnesty (Chile 1990) to lustration trials (Czechia 1993). Pahlavi proposes integrating “patriotic” Guard elements into a national defense force; Rajavi vows to disband the IRGC within one hundred days.

International stakeholders
Washington and Brussels publicly stress human rights but privately fear a security vacuum along the Strait of Hormuz. Moscow aims to retain naval access in Bandar‑e Abbas regardless of who rules Tehran. Beijing, although ideologically indifferent, seeks contractual certainty for its twenty‑five‑year cooperation pact.

Five plausible leadership architectures
1. Diaspora‑domestic co‑chairmanship—Pahlavi plus Pezeshkian share duties, placating monarchists and reformists.
2. Technocratic caretaker cabinet—Former Central Bank chief Abdolnasser Hemmati heads an interim government of economists and jurists.
3. Women‑led council—Mohammadi, Alinejad, and filmmaker Zar Amir Ebrahimi steward the transition, foregrounding gender equality.
4. Provincial federal committee—Regional leaders like Mohtadi sit on a senate‑like body drafting a federal constitution.
5. NCRI speed takeover—Rajavi returns with a ready‑made bureaucracy; viable if foreign powers seek quick order.

Citizen activism as the fulcrum
Any transition scenario turns on neighborhood councils (*shorā‑ye mahallat*) that mushroomed during the 2022–23 demonstrations, organizing everything from first‑aid stations to internet hotspots. These horizontal structures, often led by women with no partisan ties, could supply the operational capacity that charismatic leaders lack.

Conclusion
A secular future for Iran will be quilted, stitched from exiled royalty, imprisoned Nobel laureates, Kurdish commanders, and technocrats who know how to keep the lights on. Leadership will emerge not from coronation but from coalition, and its success will hinge on negotiating disagreement without descending into the factional violence that haunts the region’s history.