A long‑running dispute over alleged trade‑secret theft pits the private‑equity giant against two former Athene executives—and rekindles the saga of ex‑Apollo partner Imran Siddiqui’s insurance venture.

Next week, a New York State jury will hear Apollo Global Management’s lawsuit seeking at least $30 million in damages from two former senior employees of Athene, the insurance affiliate that has become one of Apollo’s most important engines of growth. The case against Stephen Cernich and Huan Tseng—once key figures inside Athene—caps years of skirmishing over whether confidential models, investor intelligence and deal targets were improperly used to seed a new competitor to Athene.

At the center of the dispute is Imran Siddiqui, a former senior partner at Apollo who left the firm in 2017 to launch Caldera, an insurance platform that sought to buy and reinsure life and annuity blocks. Apollo alleges that Cernich and Tseng, while no longer at Athene, assisted Siddiqui and a one‑time Apollo associate, Ming Dang, in acquiring and concealing Apollo and Athene trade secrets to accelerate Caldera’s start‑up ambitions. The defendants deny wrongdoing and argue that Apollo is trying to re‑litigate issues that were already addressed in arbitration and earlier proceedings.

Why this fight matters goes beyond old colleagues falling out. Over the past decade, private‑equity firms have transformed the economics of insurance, using annuity flows and reinsurance platforms to fund long‑dated credit and private‑market investments. Athene’s fee payments and investment mandates have been central to Apollo’s expansion into private credit and asset‑backed finance. A public jury trial about how Athene’s intellectual property was created, protected and allegedly pilfered promises an unusually detailed look inside a business that typically operates far from the courtroom spotlight.

The complaint portrays an ‘industrial espionage’ scheme in which highly sensitive actuarial models, portfolio construction tools, acquisition wish‑lists and fundraising plans were allegedly taken or repurposed for Caldera’s benefit. Apollo says that knowledge—especially around asset‑liability management, reinsurance structuring and sourcing of pension‑risk‑transfer and block transactions—amounted to a playbook painstakingly built over years as Athene grew from a niche consolidator into a global force in retirement services.

The defense insists the story is far more prosaic. Lawyers for Cernich and Tseng say the claims repackage grievances aired years ago, culminating in a 2019 arbitration award that imposed modest penalties on two ex‑Apollo professionals but rejected Apollo’s eye‑popping damage theories. They also note that Caldera never became the feared competitor that Apollo warned about.

The jury will be asked to decide whether Cernich and Tseng crossed legal lines—and precisely what harm, if any, Apollo suffered. A verdict for Apollo could strengthen employers’ hands in policing departures from high‑information roles, especially in finance where traditional non‑compete covenants are under pressure. A loss, by contrast, could chill the willingness of firms to press expansive trade‑secret theories in court, particularly when earlier proceedings have already narrowed the scope of recoverable damages.

The personalities involved underscore how tight‑knit the insurance‑PE world has become. Siddiqui now leads Talcott Financial Group, the insurance platform owned by rival investment firm Sixth Street. Cernich and Tseng have also built leadership roles within Talcott’s Bermuda‑centered reinsurance operations. Their presence there has fueled Apollo’s suspicion that valuable Athene know‑how helped competitors accelerate, a contention the defendants reject.

The conflict traces back to 2016–2017, when Apollo’s insurance ambitions were in full flight and Athene was scaling aggressively. According to court filings, Siddiqui and colleagues explored deals to anchor Caldera, including a potential bid for Fidelity & Guaranty Life. By 2018 the sides were trading lawsuits and accusations: Caldera accused Apollo of business interference and defamation, while Apollo pursued claims that its former insiders had breached duties and misused confidential information.

An arbitrator later concluded that certain document‑handling and confidentiality lapses justified around $1 million in penalties—not remotely close to the hundreds of millions Apollo had floated. Yet the arbitration did not resolve Apollo’s separate claims against the former Athene executives, setting the stage for the New York action now headed to trial. In parallel, related discovery fights have played out in federal court and in Bermuda, where Athene maintains a major reinsurance hub.

As the case reaches a jury, expect both sides to emphasize how value is actually created in modern insurance platforms. Apollo will argue that Athene’s advantage lies in proprietary actuarial modeling, risk segmentation, and an origination network for blocks and pension risk transfers—distinctive assets that cannot be reproduced overnight. The defense is likely to counter that the tools and techniques in question are widely taught and practiced across the industry, and that talent mobility—especially among actuaries and reinsurance specialists—routinely spreads know‑how without violating trade‑secret law.

The courtroom narrative will also intersect with the policy debate around private‑equity‑owned insurers. Athene and its peers have faced scrutiny over how affiliated asset managers deploy policyholder capital into private credit and structured products. Apollo has recently highlighted Athene’s asset mix and related‑party exposures as comparatively conservative, a sign that the firm is eager to shape the regulatory and reputational context in which this trial lands. The defense may argue that Apollo’s public posture undercuts the notion that its franchise has been materially damaged.

What to watch when the trial opens: whether jurors find the alleged data transfers and communications compelling enough to infer a coordinated scheme; how the court instructs the jury on what qualifies as a trade secret; and the weight jurors give to testimony from Apollo leadership about how Athene’s strategy was conceived and guarded. The defendants, for their part, will look to convince jurors that any overlap in documents or deal flow was incidental, dated, or non‑actionable—and that Apollo’s real concern is competitive, not legal.

The legal stakes are tangible—Apollo wants cash damages and validation of its efforts to wall off sensitive material—but the strategic stakes may be larger. The outcome could influence how aggressively investment groups run by asset managers try to ring‑fence their insurance affiliates’ data; how departing executives document their clean‑room practices; and whether rivals see litigation risk as a cost of doing business or a deterrent to poaching and start‑ups.

However the jury rules, the case is a reminder that private‑market finance is built on people, models and relationships as much as on capital. When those elements move, firms will argue over what is portable and what must remain behind. After years of motions and satellite proceedings, Apollo will now put its story to a jury. The verdict will reverberate through an industry where the line between strategy and secrets—and between fair competition and foul—can be perilously thin.