Transport Ministry: “Already financed, no NATO funds.” After U.S. pushback, Giorgetti and Crosetto hunt for a Plan B to reach the 5% target.

The U.S. ‘brake’ on Italy’s most emblematic infrastructure gamble arrived with unusual clarity. Asked at the Bled Strategic Forum whether the planned bridge over the Strait of Messina could be counted as legitimate defence spending, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, warned allies against “creative accounting,” signalling that projects with little direct military utility would not pass muster toward the Alliance’s new spending yardstick. For Rome, which had floated the idea of treating the bridge as a dual‑use asset that eases military mobility, the message landed like a red light on a long‑awaited greenfield build.

Within hours, Italy’s Infrastructure and Transport Ministry moved to cool the controversy. “The Strait of Messina Bridge is already entirely financed with state resources and no defence funds are earmarked,” the ministry said in a written statement. “Any possible use of NATO resources is not on the agenda and, above all, is not an indispensable necessity. The project is not in question.” The clarification was calibrated to defuse a growing political conflagration without walking away from the bridge itself—a signature promise of Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Matteo Salvini.

At stake is not just a 3.3‑kilometre single‑span suspension bridge—slated to be the longest of its kind in the world—but the logic of how Italy plans to reach NATO’s new 2035 benchmark: five percent of GDP for defence and security combined. Under the outline discussed by Allies this summer, the goal is split between roughly 3.5 percent in core military outlays and 1.5 percent in enabling infrastructure for defence. In that latter bucket, the government had tested whether the Messina crossing—linking Calabria and Sicily, home to key Italian and NATO installations—could credibly be logged as strategic infrastructure.

Numbers explain the political temptation. The bridge’s price tag is put at about €13.5 billion (roughly $15.7 billion). Italian analysts estimate that during peak construction years the project might represent about 0.2 percentage points of GDP annually, a meaningful boost when Rome is mapping a glide path toward the 5 percent threshold. Folding those billions into the 1.5 percent ‘enablers’ line would have eased the arithmetic for the Treasury—led by Economy Minister Giancarlo Giorgetti—while allowing Defence Minister Guido Crosetto to protect military procurement plans already under strain from inflation and a busier operational tempo.

Washington’s demurral changes that calculus. Whitaker’s intervention, relayed in an interview that ricocheted across European capitals, underscores two realities. First, the United States expects allies to meet the higher bar with spending that is recognisably military or tightly defense‑related. Second, it expects transparency over what qualifies as ‘enabling’ infrastructure. Bridges of broad economic value but limited specific military function may struggle to qualify—especially when they risk being perceived as budget work‑arounds.

Rome’s rebuttal—that the bridge is funded anyway—aims to keep the construction calendar insulated from the transatlantic dispute. But it also leaves the government with a more demanding budget exercise this autumn. If the Messina costs cannot be booked under NATO‑related accounting, Giorgetti and Crosetto need a Plan B to reach the stepped‑up target without over‑promising or provoking the bond market. That search will dominate September’s run‑up to the budget law and the months that follow.

The politics of the bridge have always been larger than steel and concrete. Successive governments—from Silvio Berlusconi’s years to today—have revived the plan only to see it stall under a tangle of engineering, environmental and legal hurdles. The current version has cleared several milestones and is pitched by the governing coalition as an economic and strategic unifier, shrinking travel times, knitting Sicily more tightly into national supply chains and, yes, improving ‘military mobility’ across the central Mediterranean. Supporters say Sicily’s bases and shipyards would be easier to sustain and surge through a robust fixed link to the mainland.

Opponents counter with familiar and fresh objections: seismic risk in one of Europe’s most earthquake‑prone corridors; the environmental footprint along treasured coasts and migratory routes; urban disruption in Messina and Villa San Giovanni; and the project’s vulnerability as a prominent symbolic target in conflict. A Washington Post analysis this week framed the bridge as a bold bet wrapped in controversy, noting that environmental regulators and the Court of Auditors still have a say before full construction accelerates. Meanwhile, local scepticism persists, shaped by doubts about timelines, procurement governance and the opportunity cost of committing tens of billions while much of the South’s existing transport grid needs upgrades.

Beyond the passions of Sicily and Calabria, the transatlantic dimension now centres on definitions. The NATO yardstick allows for ‘enabling’ infrastructure, but the category is meant to be tightly connected to defence: ports and airfields that can handle heavy transports, rail corridors engineered for military loads, hardening and redundancy for critical logistics nodes, cyber‑secure networks for command and control. Italy has a long list of such projects—in some cases already co‑funded with the European Union under the Military Mobility programme—that could plausibly populate the 1.5 percent tranche without inviting accusations of semantic gymnastics.

In practical terms, three Plan‑B families are emerging in policy conversations in Rome: (1) Re‑weighting procurement and readiness—accelerating munitions stockpiles, air and missile defence layers, and maintenance backlogs that improve real‑world availability across the services; (2) Re‑prioritising enabling infrastructure with clear military utility—upgrades to roll‑on/roll‑off port capacity, airbase aprons and fuel farms, strategic rail and road corridors designed for heavy convoys; and (3) Budget sequencing—phasing in multi‑year programmes so that annual outlays climb steadily toward the 2035 goal without sudden spikes.

Each pathway carries trade‑offs. Procurement surges require fresh cash and industrial capacity in a defence sector already running hot. Infrastructure upgrades must pass rigorous feasibility tests, permitting and sometimes local resistance. Sequencing is fiscally prudent but vulnerable to political cycles. The bridge’s removal from the NATO‑related ledger does not make the 5 percent unreachable, but it forces the government to be more explicit about the mix—perhaps a healthy discipline after years of elastic targets and optimistic timelines.

None of this precludes the Messina project itself. The ministry’s insistence that state financing is ‘already in place’ is meant to ring‑fence the bridge from the NATO debate and reassure contractors and local authorities that the pipeline will flow. Yet, in a constrained budget, large civil‑works commitments inevitably interact with defence ambitions. If revenues disappoint or growth slows, pressure grows to choose between concrete now and kit later. That is why the project became entangled with the 5 percent conversation in the first place—and why the U.S. pushback has ramifications beyond classification rules.

For investors and allies reading Italy’s trajectory, credibility is the currency. Counting a major civilian bridge toward defence would have provided short‑term relief on spreadsheets at the risk of long‑term doubt about definitions. By drawing a line, Washington has nudged Rome toward a cleaner path: finance the bridge as a nation‑building project if you wish, but meet the defence target with defence spending and tightly‑linked enablers. In return, allies will be more likely to take Italy’s numbers—and its capabilities—at face value.

So what happens now? Expect the Economy and Defence ministries to publish, alongside the budget, a clearer taxonomy of eligible ‘enabling’ projects, and to detail the step‑ups in procurement and readiness through 2026–2027. Expect, too, for the bridge to remain a political banner for the governing coalition, which will argue that economic growth from construction and improved mobility ultimately strengthens national security—even if the dollars and euros do not count toward NATO’s ledger. Opponents will seize on any slippage in costs or schedules as proof that the project is a distraction from more urgent upgrades to ports, rail and power resilience.

The debate over the Messina crossing has always been a referendum on what kind of growth and security Italy wants. The U.S. intervention narrowed the accounting choices; it did not end the strategic debate. If the bridge rises, it will do so as an Italian investment in connectivity and pride. If Italy reaches the 5 percent without it, it will do so with a cleaner set of books and, arguably, a stronger claim that its armed forces are better equipped for a harsher world. Either way, the numbers will have to add up—for markets, for allies and, above all, for Italians getting from one shore to the other.

What to watch next: 1) the government’s autumn budget draft and its breakdown of defence versus enabling infrastructure; 2) any updated cost and phasing guidance from the project company for the bridge; 3) signals from NATO on how it will audit the 1.5 percent category; and 4) rulings by environmental and audit authorities that could still shape the construction calendar.

Sources

– Bloomberg interview with U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker (Sept. 2–3, 2025): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-09-02/us-frowns-on-italy-s-idea-of-making-sicily-bridge-a-nato-asset

– Italy’s Transport Ministry statement reported by Euronews (Sept. 3, 2025): https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/09/03/usa-no-al-ponte-di-messina-nelle-spese-nato-litalia-replica-non-previsti-fondi-per-la-dife

– Defense News coverage of Italy ruling out NATO funds and budget math (Sept. 3, 2025): https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/09/03/italy-disavows-plan-to-count-massive-sicily-bridge-as-nato-spending/

– Washington Post analysis on the bridge’s political controversy and approvals (Aug. 31, 2025): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/08/31/italy-sicily-bridge-nato-military/

– Sky TG24 summary of U.S. pushback and Italy’s reply (Sept. 3, 2025): https://tg24.sky.it/economia/2025/09/03/ponte-stretto-spese-militari-nato