A UN trade agency warns of “debilitating” hits to some of Africa’s most successful export industries as Washington dithers over the 25-year-old US–Africa trade pact.

JOHANNESBURG/NAIROBI — A quarter-century after the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) opened the door to duty‑free access for thousands of products, parts of Africa’s manufacturing base are bracing for impact. With the Trump administration yet to secure a renewal from Congress and the pact due to expire next week, a United Nations trade body has warned the fallout could be “debilitating” for some of the continent’s star exporters.

The warning, delivered in recent weeks by senior officials and reinforced by new modelling from trade specialists, is not abstract. From Lesotho’s garment factories to South Africa’s auto plants and Kenya’s apparel and floriculture exporters, entire ecosystems have been built around predictably low—or zero—tariffs into the United States. A sudden lapse would reroute orders, idle production lines and jeopardize hundreds of thousands of jobs across supplier networks, industrial parks and logistics corridors.

What follows is a sector‑by‑sector, country‑by‑country snapshot of the most exposed industries—and why some are uniquely vulnerable if AGOA vanishes, even for a few months. Procurement cycles in fashion and autos are long; once buyers move their seasonal orders or platform allocations, those volumes don’t quickly return.

Apparel & Textiles: Lesotho, Eswatini, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius

No sector is as tightly coupled to AGOA as clothing. Lesotho, a landlocked country of 2.3 million, stitched its modern export economy on the back of the programme. Duty‑free treatment helped it attract Asian investors who set up large cut‑make‑trim operations for American brands. Analysts estimate that without AGOA, U.S. tariffs on many apparel lines would jump to double‑digit rates—enough to erase thin margins and trigger immediate order diversions to competitors in Central America and Asia.

Lesotho’s exposure is mirrored across Eswatini and Madagascar, where clusters of knitwear and lingerie factories have flourished. Kenya has also become a significant supplier of basic apparel, with industrial parks around Nairobi and Athi River tied into U.S. fast‑fashion calendars. Mauritius, though more diversified and up‑market, would still face a tariff shock on cotton and man‑made fibre garments. The risk is not just lost exports; it’s the unraveling of painstakingly built supplier bases—from yarn spinners and dye‑houses to trucking companies and worker training centres.

Automotives & Components: South Africa, Morocco’s adjacency, and the regional web

South Africa’s auto industry is the continent’s flagship manufacturer, exporting finished vehicles and a deep range of components. Although a significant share ships to Europe and the UK, the U.S. is a vital market for certain models and parts. A lapse in duty‑free access could lead global carmakers to rebalance their allocations away from South Africa toward plants inside the United States, Mexico or Asia, particularly for niche models. Component suppliers—from catalytic converters to wiring harnesses—are highly sensitive to tariff changes because they compete on razor‑thin unit costs.

The exposure extends indirectly to neighbouring countries integrated into South Africa’s supply chains, including Botswana and Namibia for inputs such as leather and metals. While Morocco’s car cluster is primarily oriented to the EU, any U.S. tariff uncertainty squeezes Africa’s overall attractiveness for future investment in EV components, batteries and advanced assemblies.

Agro‑processing & Specialty Crops: Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire

Beyond garments and cars, AGOA has catalysed growth in processed foods and high‑value crops. Kenya ships cut flowers, canned pineapple, roasted coffee and nut products to U.S. buyers; a return to most‑favoured‑nation (MFN) tariffs would compress margins and complicate cold‑chain planning for perishables. Ghana’s cocoa‑adjacent industries—confectionery, cocoa butter and powder—have inched up the value chain with AGOA preferences. Côte d’Ivoire’s cashew processing and Ethiopia’s coffee roasting are similar stories: small but strategic footholds that depend on predictable, low‑tariff access while quality and branding improve.

For these sectors, logistics are as critical as tariffs. Even a brief hiatus can force buyers to reroute via Europe or scale back African sourcing for a season, undermining hard‑won shelf space in U.S. retail.

Footwear & Leather: Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Africa

Ethiopia’s leather goods and footwear ambitions have seesawed in recent years, but a cohort of tanneries and assemblers remains export‑ready. Tanzania’s hides and skins processors and South Africa’s specialty footwear makers face similar arithmetic: once duty‑free access disappears, price points jump above consumer tolerance levels, and orders migrate to Vietnam or Latin America.

Chemicals, Plastics & Consumer Goods: South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia

Several African producers have carved out niches in household plastics, packaging, basic chemicals and cosmetics for the U.S. market. South African firms in particular have benefitted from scale and reliable quality standards. While these categories are less labour‑dense than apparel, the tariff incidence on finished goods is often high—again incentivizing rapid sourcing switches if preferences lapse.

Why Even a Short Lapse Hurts

Trade lawyers often argue that Congress can renew preferences retroactively. On paper, that would allow refunds of duties paid during a gap. But manufacturers warn that purchase orders, merchandising calendars and production planning don’t operate on legal theory. Brands and Tier‑1 suppliers rebook months ahead. Once a Lesotho factory loses a spring or back‑to‑school season, the cash‑flow hit can be existential—and workers can’t simply be furloughed for a quarter without consequences.

Who Could Gain, and What Might Offset Losses

If AGOA ends without a tailored transition, a handful of countries with relatively low MFN tariffs on specific lines could see limited advantages. Some Senegalese seafood products or Gambian goods may retain competitive duty rates under generalised systems, but these are exceptions. China’s expansion of tariff‑free access for dozens of African countries has also created an alternative—yet for most firms, the U.S. remains a prized market for diversification and higher unit values.

Regionally, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continues to lower intra‑African barriers, and some apparel makers have begun sourcing fabrics within the continent to meet rules‑of‑origin. That trend could cushion blows over time, but it cannot replace the U.S. consumer in the short run.

Policy Options on the Table—Days, Not Months

African governments and industry groups are pressing for a stop‑gap extension of one to five years to avoid a cliff‑edge. A narrow extension would stabilise orders while Washington debates longer‑term recalibration: stricter governance criteria, product list updates, deeper cumulation rules with AfCFTA, and stronger labour and environmental provisions.

For the United States, the calculus is strategic as well as economic. Allowing a signature development instrument to lapse—just as global trade fragments and Beijing expands duty‑free access for African partners—would undercut years of diplomatic investment. U.S. buyers also have self‑interest at stake: diversified sourcing helps offset supply‑chain shocks and geopolitics elsewhere.

Most Exposed: Quick Takes

• Lesotho (Apparel): Highest concentration risk. A double‑digit tariff snap‑back on core HS lines could strip margins overnight and trigger plant closures.
• Eswatini & Madagascar (Apparel): Similar vulnerability in knitwear and lingerie; clusters reliant on continuous U.S. orders.
• Kenya (Apparel, Agro‑processing, Floriculture): Apparel parks, nuts and processed foods face margin compression; perishables suffer from booking volatility.
• South Africa (Automotives, Chemicals, Consumer Goods): Vehicle allocations and component supply at risk; knock‑on effects to neighbouring suppliers.
• Mauritius (Apparel, Textiles): Up‑market positioning helps, but MFN tariffs still bite on key product lines.
• Tanzania & Ethiopia (Leather/Footwear): Price‑sensitive categories likely to see immediate order switches.
• Ghana & Côte d’Ivoire (Cocoa‑adjacent processing, Cashew): Value‑addition gains could stall without predictable U.S. access.

What to Watch Next

• Any interim extension from Washington—even for one year—would keep orders onshore and save jobs while a fuller revamp is negotiated.
• Buyer behaviour in Q4 booking windows for 2026 spring/summer fashion lines; cancellations now would show up as factory slowdowns by December.
• Signs of re‑routing to the EU, UK and China: helpful, but unlikely to absorb like‑for‑like volumes quickly.
• Domestic policy responses: payroll support, expedited VAT refunds and working‑capital facilities to bridge cash‑flow gaps in highly exposed clusters.

The broader message is about credibility. For 25 years, AGOA has been the flagship of U.S.–Africa economic engagement, encouraging investment in factories, training and compliance systems. Letting it expire—even briefly—would send a chilling signal that partnership is negotiable, precisely when certainty is the raw material Africa’s manufacturers need most.

Sources consulted: UN Trade & Development publications (Global Trade Update 2025; World Tariff Profiles 2025), Reuters reporting in September 2025 on AGOA, and Financial Times reporting on exposure by sector and country.