Scores of EU lawmakers earn from second jobs that overlap with their lawmaking — reigniting fears over conflicts of interest and patchy disclosure rules

BRUSSELS — The European Parliament has pledged, time and again, to learn the lessons of scandal. Yet a new wave of disclosures shows that many of its members still hold paid second jobs in sectors where they help write the rules, exposing fault lines in the EU’s system for managing conflicts of interest.

A fresh analysis published this month by investigative reporters and transparency campaigners points to dozens of lawmakers with remunerated outside roles that overlap with their committee work. A Financial Times review identified 59 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) with paid side activities in sectors directly linked to EU files they influence — from digital regulation and telecoms to agriculture, finance and insolvency law — while only a small fraction explicitly acknowledged potential conflicts in their paperwork. Transparency International EU (TI EU) adds that MEPs collectively earn millions in outside income each year and that declarations remain plagued by vague job descriptions and imprecise payment ranges.

Those twin findings have revived a familiar question in Brussels: when does legitimate professional experience become a problematic financial interest?

The European Parliament’s code of conduct permits side activities as long as they are not used for lobbying and are declared; but it does not ban overlaps between a lawmaker’s paid role and the sector they regulate. In practice, that leaves significant grey areas. Some MEPs argue that continued ties to industry, academia or the legal profession keep them plugged into the real economy; critics counter that the arrangement invites undue influence, particularly on technical files where a few well-placed amendments can tilt billion-euro markets.

Specific cases have sharpened the debate. High-profile lawmakers who shepherd data privacy and telecoms files have reported remunerated work with companies or firms active in the same space. Another MEP heavily involved in insolvency and company law holds a stake in an insolvency practice. None of these activities are automatically illegal or even prohibited by Parliament’s rules; but they highlight how easily roles can straddle both sides of the regulatory fence.

The stakes are not theoretical. The Parliament is now central to an unusually dense legislative calendar: updating the Digital Services Act and AI liability frameworks, advancing capital markets union measures, and directing the bloc’s climate and security transitions. In each of these domains, well‑timed amendments can shift compliance burdens or open new loopholes. “The risk is not just vote-buying,” says one senior EU official. “It’s subtle agenda shaping, drafting, or delaying clauses that have outsize effects on the ground.”

Reform efforts after the 2022 “Qatargate” affair — when Belgian authorities alleged cash-for-influence involving a Parliament vice-president and others — focused on tightening access rules for lobbyists and restricting trips funded by third parties. They did not, however, introduce a hard ban on second jobs linked to regulated sectors, nor did they create the independent ethics body that proponents say would bring credible oversight across EU institutions. Several member states and parliamentary groups balked at the scope of such a body, and the file has stalled.

In the meantime, the system relies on disclosures that are often incomplete. TI EU’s analysis of lawmakers’ declarations found hundreds of side activities described in generic terms (“consultancy,” “legal advice,” “board member”) without naming the client, the precise role, or the deliverables. Estimated income is reported in broad bands, sometimes so wide that watchdogs say they obscure more than they reveal. The Parliament can request clarifications and, in theory, sanction non-compliance — but enforcement is patchy, and there is little ex‑ante screening before conflicts arise.

The problem is magnified by the Parliament’s committee structure. MEPs build influence by specializing: a lawyer steeped in insolvency practice gravitates to legal affairs, a former agronomist to agriculture, a telecoms engineer to the industry committee. That specialization is supposed to produce better law. But when the same expertise is also monetized outside the hemicycle — through advisory roles, of counsel arrangements, expert testimonies, or corporate directorships — the potential for overlapping incentives grows. Even when walls are erected (no participation on specific files, recusal from amendments), the perception of bias lingers.

“Perception matters,” says a former ethics adviser to a national parliament. “Public trust is not a legal formula; it’s the feeling that your representatives’ first loyalty is to the public interest. If voters must parse footnotes to know who pays their MEP, the system is not working.”

Some MEPs defend side roles emphatically. A centrist lawmaker involved in the Parliament’s research policy says his occasional paid lectures and advisory work with universities are transparent and benefit EU lawmaking. “We need practitioners,” he says. “If you ban everything, you end up with a professional political class cut off from the economy.” Industry groups make a similar case, arguing that lawmakers who understand commercial realities produce more workable rules.

Yet the experience of recent years cuts both ways. Belgian investigators have pursued separate inquiries into suspected foreign influence operations in Brussels, including a 2025 probe involving a major technology company. And national courts have delivered stinging verdicts in related misuse‑of‑funds cases. While these episodes differ from side-job disclosures, they reinforce public unease about porous ethics controls at the heart of EU decision‑making.

What would a fix look like? TI EU and other advocates propose a clear red line: ban paid or unpaid roles with organizations that seek to influence EU policymaking — including law firms, consultancies, trade associations and companies registered in the EU’s Transparency Register — when those roles overlap with a lawmaker’s legislative portfolio. They also want pre‑screening of declarations, mandatory naming of clients, narrower income bands, and real sanctions for failures to disclose. Academics recommend adding cooling‑off rules inside the mandate — not just after leaving office — when a file directly affects a declared outside interest.

Supporters of stricter rules note that other legislatures have moved in this direction. Some national parliaments limit or prohibit second jobs that may conflict with a member’s duties, cap earnings from external work, or outright ban paid advocacy. The European Parliament, by contrast, codifies a ban on acting as a paid lobbyist but leaves most overlaps to the member’s judgment and post‑hoc transparency.

Procedural tweaks could help. One idea gaining traction would force a real‑time “conflict box” on every amendment tabled by an MEP, requiring a simple yes/no declaration of whether the member (or their close family) has a relevant financial link. Another would empower committee chairs to initiate swift, provisional recusals when doubts arise, pending a formal ethics review. And civil society groups want publication of machine‑readable declarations, linked to committee assignments, rapporteurships and voting records so that journalists and citizens can more easily spot red flags.

Politics, as ever, is the obstacle. A blanket ban would ensnare influential figures and narrow the pipeline of future talent, parties warn. The Parliament’s legal services are likely to insist on a proportionate approach compatible with fundamental rights, including the right to work. And some fear that stricter EU‑level rules could push activities into less visible national channels.

Still, the equation has shifted. The new Parliament arrived in July with a harder security and industrial policy edge; defence and tech files are more sensitive than in the previous mandate. The post‑Qatargate scrutiny has not faded. And public tolerance for revolving doors and side gigs has diminished, especially when wages and living costs squeeze voters across the bloc.

The core choice remains whether to settle for better paperwork or to change the incentives. As long as moonlighting that overlaps with legislative portfolios is permitted, advocates say, disclosures will remain a fire extinguisher — useful after the smoke is visible, too late to stop the spark.

For now, the Parliament promises more guidance and a fresh look at its code. But the lesson of recent headlines is plain: in a system built on compromise and trust, ambiguity is not neutral. It is a risk that lawmakers, and the institution they serve, can no longer afford.