Big Tech platforms and online personalities are increasingly seen as frontline actors in defending democratic resilience

As Europe braces for another cycle of high‑stake elections and geopolitical uncertainties, a new front has opened in the fight against hybrid threats: online influencers. In recent months, the European Commission and member states have shifted their gaze to not only the major platforms of Facebook, X (formerly Twitter) and TikTok, but also the creator communities that drive much of the viral content seen by younger audiences.

The underlying logic is straightforward: while governments and regulators continue to press tech firms for greater transparency and moderation of disinformation, digital creators often command direct access to audiences that are harder to reach via traditional media or official channels. By collaborating with, rather than simply policing, these creators, European authorities hope to build a more resilient information ecosystem—one where “trusted voices” inside social networks counteract misleading narratives, foreign interference campaigns and viral misinformation.

From regulation to engagement
Until recently, much of the European Union’s approach to online harms has focused on hard law: the Digital Services Act (DSA) requires large online platforms to apply more rigorous moderation, transparency and risk‑mitigation practices. Regulators have also toyed with the idea of designating certain kinds of coordinated disinformation campaigns as illegal content. However, officials now recognise that regulation alone may not suffice, particularly when much of the threat is subtle, peer‑to‑peer, algorithmically amplified and intentionally designed to appear “organic”.

As a consequence, the Commission launched a fresh initiative this autumn: through a public‑private partnership, major platforms and a selected cohort of influencer creators will receive specialised briefings on hybrid‑threat tactics and misinformation trends emerging ahead of key European political cycles. The aim: empower these creators to recognise, call out and mitigate misleading narratives in real time. One EU official described it as “shifting from a reactive model of takedowns to a proactive model of peer‑to‑peer resilience”.

How creators can help
The logic of involving influencers rests on three key assumptions.

1. Reach + trust. Many younger citizens obtain political or current‑affairs cues via creators they follow, rather than news outlets or official channels. Engaging creators means tapping into that direct line of communication.
2. Flexibility + creativity. Influencers are accustomed to producing content formats (short‑form video, stories, live Q&A) that can respond swiftly to emerging issues—an asset when disinformation surges.
3. Network effect. A creator signalling caution about a misleading claim can trigger immediate amplification among their followers, accelerating refutation before the claim spreads widely.

One example: a creator who works in the science/tech space was recently briefed on the warning signs of foreign‑state interference (such as sudden bot‑driven spikes in engagement around obscure videos). The creator then produced a short film illustrating these tactics in everyday language and shared it across social platforms in several EU languages. According to Commission figures, the film generated thousands of shares within hours—a timescale far faster than many classical fact‑checking organisations can operate.

The platform role and caveats
Major tech firms remain central to the strategy. As part of the initiative, they agreed to improve data‑sharing with creators—such as notifying them when their content is being suddenly amplified by questionable networks, and furnishing “influence‑path” analytics that let creators see how messages propagate across follower graphs. One platform executive described it as “giving creators the tools of digital forensics, not just metrics of views”.

Nevertheless, the model isn’t without risks. Some analysts caution that tying creators too closely to state‑aligned messaging could blur lines between legitimate civic engagement and propaganda‑style communications. There’s also the challenge of defining “influencer” in this context: while high‑follower stars attract attention, many hybrid threat actors deploy micro‑influencers (with thousands, not millions, of followers) because they are less visible to moderation systems.

To mitigate these risks, the Commission’s framework emphasises voluntary participation, transparency of funding and full disclosure of advocacy content. Platforms are contractually obliged to ensure creators in the programme display appropriate disclaimers when addressing sensitive issues, and that they maintain editorial independence.

Preparing for elections and beyond
With multiple national elections looming in Europe, officials view this influencer‑oriented campaign as part of a broader “societal defence” posture—alongside tech regulation, media‑literacy funding and strategic communications by governments. In a briefing document, the Commission listed the objective bluntly: “refrigerate the spread of disinformation through trusted interpersonal channels”.

Yet observers note that success will hinge on scalability and longevity. One cautionary voice from a civil‑society watchdog warned: “Creators may launch strong efforts ahead of a vote, but the diffuser model only works if the relationships and routines persist between elections. Otherwise you risk bursts of activity followed by complacency.”

What comes next?
Looking ahead, several enhancements are under discussion:

• Introducing rapid‑alert systems that flag viral rumours in multiple EU languages and broadcast them to creator networks.
• Developing creator‑led “myth‑busting” content hubs hosted on major platforms, combining engaging formats (live debate, interactive polls) with rigorous fact‑checking.
• Expanding outreach beyond high‑visibility influencers to niche communities (gaming, lifestyle, regional dialects)—thereby reaching demographic groups often ignored by mainstream campaigns.

Final word
In a digital era where disinformation can flicker across networks faster than even regulators can respond, the EU’s turn to influencers represents a strategic shift: from policing platforms post‑factum to cultivating a distributed web of social resilience in advance. Whether this hybrid model—of regulation, platform cooperation and creator engagement—will deliver long‑term democratic payoff remains to be seen. What is clear is that the information battle‑space no longer ends at the platform’s door—it extends directly into the feeds of individuals whose follow‑lists can shape perceptions, choices and ultimately the health of democratic processes.