The proposed 30-year cooperation agreement could unlock billions of dollars in contracts for American companies, but its approach to uranium enrichment and international inspections is set to provoke a fierce debate over security in the Middle East.
President Donald Trump has approved a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, according to people familiar with the decision, advancing a long-sought ambition of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman while opening one of the world’s most valuable emerging energy markets to American companies.
The agreement, which has not yet been formally announced, is expected to remain in force for 30 years and could allow United States companies to help Saudi Arabia develop a civilian nuclear-power industry. It may also create a route toward domestic uranium enrichment—an outcome that nonproliferation experts and members of Congress have repeatedly warned could transform the strategic balance of the Middle East.
For Riyadh, the agreement represents an important diplomatic and technological victory. Saudi leaders have argued that nuclear power is necessary to satisfy rising domestic electricity demand, reduce the amount of oil burned for power generation and support the kingdom’s broader effort to diversify its economy.
For Washington, the arrangement carries substantial commercial promise. Saudi Arabia’s plans could generate contracts worth tens of billions of dollars for reactor manufacturers, engineering groups, fuel suppliers and construction companies. Westinghouse Electric is regarded as one of the American businesses best positioned to benefit if Riyadh proceeds with the construction of large nuclear reactors.
The agreement would also strengthen the United States’ position in a strategically competitive market. Without an American partnership, Saudi Arabia could turn to nuclear suppliers from China, Russia, South Korea or France. The Trump administration has presented international nuclear cooperation as both an economic opportunity and a means of ensuring that countries adopting atomic energy operate with American technology and maintain long-term relationships with Washington.
Negotiations reached an important milestone in November 2025, when US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman announced that the two countries had completed talks on civil nuclear cooperation. Trump’s reported approval brings the arrangement closer to implementation, although it must still pass through a congressional review process.
The most controversial issue is whether Saudi Arabia will eventually be permitted to enrich uranium on its own territory. Enrichment can produce fuel for civilian reactors, but the same technology can also be used to create highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons if material is processed to a much higher concentration.
Under the reported terms, Washington and Riyadh could conduct a joint study examining the feasibility of a Saudi enrichment facility. Any resulting installation would reportedly be built and operated under restrictions designed to prevent the technology from being diverted to military purposes. However, critics argue that giving the kingdom access to enrichment infrastructure would still create knowledge, equipment and expertise that could shorten the path to a nuclear weapon during a future crisis.
Those concerns have been intensified by earlier comments from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has said Saudi Arabia would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran acquired one. Although Riyadh maintains that its nuclear plans are peaceful, that statement has become central to the debate over whether the United States should assist the kingdom in developing sensitive fuel-cycle capabilities.
The Saudi agreement reportedly does not contain the full “gold standard” adopted by the United Arab Emirates in its 2009 nuclear accord with Washington. The Emirati government formally renounced domestic uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel—two activities associated with potential pathways to producing weapons material. Saudi Arabia has resisted making the same commitment.
The deal is also expected to proceed without requiring Saudi Arabia to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol. That measure gives international inspectors broader access to information and locations, helping them investigate whether undeclared nuclear material or activities may exist beyond officially registered facilities.
The Trump administration has defended the arrangement as consistent with strong nonproliferation principles and is expected to rely partly on a separate bilateral safeguards system. Opponents, however, are likely to question why Saudi Arabia should receive less restrictive terms than the UAE, particularly when Washington has simultaneously pressed Iran to accept severe limitations on its own nuclear activities.
The agreement is expected to be submitted to Congress as a so-called Section 123 agreement, named after the relevant part of the US Atomic Energy Act. Such agreements establish the legal framework required before significant American nuclear materials, equipment or technology can be transferred to another country.
Congress will have two review periods amounting to 90 days of continuous session. Unless lawmakers pass a joint resolution rejecting the arrangement and successfully overcome any presidential veto, a standard agreement can eventually enter into force without an affirmative vote of approval.
Resistance could cross party lines. Democratic lawmakers have already demanded legally binding restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing, while senior Republicans have also previously called for a gold-standard agreement. The dispute will force Congress to weigh the economic and strategic advantages of keeping Saudi Arabia within the American nuclear system against the danger of weakening safeguards that Washington has promoted elsewhere.
Supporters of the deal are likely to argue that rejecting Riyadh’s demands would not prevent the kingdom from pursuing nuclear power. Instead, it could push Saudi Arabia toward suppliers with less demanding security, transparency and export-control standards, reducing Washington’s influence over the program.
Critics will respond that commercial competition should not determine nuclear policy. They fear that allowing Saudi enrichment could encourage Turkey, Egypt and other regional powers to demand similar capabilities, gradually transforming a civilian energy market into a competition for latent nuclear-weapons capacity.
The agreement therefore extends far beyond the construction of power plants. It is a test of whether the United States can expand its nuclear industry abroad while preserving the nonproliferation rules that have traditionally accompanied American technology.
For Saudi Arabia, Trump’s approval is a major step toward technological autonomy and international recognition as a nuclear-energy power. For American companies, it could become one of the industry’s most lucrative opportunities in decades. For the wider Middle East, however, the deal may introduce a new source of uncertainty into a region already defined by rivalry, war and deep distrust over nuclear intentions.
