Berlin is preparing its most consequential expansion of intelligence powers in decades, granting its spy agencies stronger cyber and surveillance capabilities as Germany confronts Russian sabotage, espionage and disinformation while seeking greater strategic autonomy from the United States.
Germany is moving to dramatically strengthen the powers of its intelligence services, marking a significant shift in a country that has historically imposed unusually strict limits on state surveillance. The reform reflects Berlin’s growing conviction that the security environment created by Russia’s confrontation with Europe can no longer be managed with intelligence institutions designed for the comparatively stable post-Cold War era.
The German cabinet approved draft legislation on August 12 that would expand the authority of both the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or BND, Germany’s foreign intelligence service, and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the BfV, which is responsible for domestic security. The proposals still require parliamentary approval.
At the centre of the reform is a fundamental change in philosophy. German intelligence agencies have traditionally been expected primarily to collect, analyse and report information. Under the proposed legislation, they would gain greater scope to intervene directly against hostile operations.
The BND could be authorised to penetrate foreign computer systems, interfere with hostile digital infrastructure and conduct counter-cyber operations intended to disrupt attacks before they reach German targets. The legislation would also broaden access to electronic communications and allow intelligence agencies to make greater use of artificial intelligence in processing large quantities of information.
Such authorities would move German intelligence closer to the more operational model used by several of its closest allies.
For Berlin, the urgency is being driven above all by what officials describe as a rapidly expanding spectrum of hybrid threats. These include espionage, cyberattacks, sabotage, covert influence operations, disinformation and attempts to disrupt critical infrastructure without crossing the threshold into conventional warfare.
Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt recently described Germany as a daily target of hybrid warfare, warning that espionage, sabotage, cyber operations and covert action by foreign powers had become a persistent reality rather than an occasional security problem.
Russia is central to that assessment.
German security officials have repeatedly warned that Moscow is using intelligence operations and other unconventional instruments to pressure European governments supporting Ukraine. Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and one of Kyiv’s most important military and financial backers, represents an especially valuable target.
The threat is difficult to counter precisely because many operations occupy the grey zone between espionage, criminal activity and direct state aggression.
A cyberattack against a logistics company, interference with a railway network or an apparently isolated act of sabotage may initially appear disconnected from geopolitics. Intelligence agencies must determine whether the event is criminal, ideological or part of a coordinated operation directed by a foreign state.
Germany’s security authorities increasingly believe that this ambiguity is itself part of the strategy.
Recent incidents have reinforced those concerns. German officials highlighted the discovery of an explosive-laden drone near Leipzig/Halle airport as an example of the kind of unconventional threat confronting European infrastructure. The episode contributed to renewed calls for stronger intelligence and counter-drone capabilities.
Germany’s military leadership has issued similarly stark warnings. General Carsten Breuer, the country’s senior military officer, has argued that Russia is using hybrid methods, including drone activity, to probe NATO defences and identify vulnerabilities across the alliance.
The intelligence reforms therefore form part of a much broader transformation of German security policy.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shattered assumptions that had shaped Berlin’s strategic thinking for decades. Germany subsequently increased defence spending, expanded military procurement and committed itself to playing a larger role in European security.
The intelligence services are now undergoing their own version of that transformation.
For the BND in particular, the proposed legislation could represent one of the largest expansions of operational authority in its modern history.
Previous draft proposals examined by Reuters included powers allowing German intelligence to hack hostile systems, disrupt foreign operations and deceive adversaries. The objective is to give intelligence officers the capacity not simply to observe an attack but, under defined circumstances, to interfere with the infrastructure being used to conduct it.
That distinction is strategically important.
Traditional intelligence collection seeks to discover what an adversary is doing. Active intelligence operations attempt to alter the adversary’s ability to act.
In the cyber domain, that might involve penetrating the servers used to prepare an attack or disabling malicious infrastructure. Other measures contemplated in the broader reform debate could allow German agencies to interfere with hostile logistical or operational networks overseas.
These capabilities would remain subject to legal limitations and oversight mechanisms. The reform provides for supervision by Germany’s Independent Control Council, reflecting the continuing sensitivity surrounding surveillance powers.
That sensitivity has deep historical roots.
Germany’s experience under both the Nazi dictatorship and East Germany’s Stasi surveillance system created powerful political resistance to unrestricted intelligence gathering. Modern German law consequently developed extensive privacy protections and strict controls over government surveillance.
The tension between historical safeguards and contemporary security requirements is now becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.
Civil-liberties advocates and some opposition politicians have warned that expanding intelligence powers could weaken privacy protections or give security agencies overly broad authority. Critics are particularly concerned about intrusive digital surveillance, state hacking and the use of sophisticated analytical technologies such as artificial intelligence.
Supporters of the reform counter that excessive legal restrictions have left Germany dependent on allies that possess capabilities Berlin itself cannot deploy.
That dependence has become another major motivation for change.
Senior German officials have acknowledged that intelligence supplied by foreign partners has been crucial in identifying threats to Germany. Thorsten Frei, head of the chancellery, said earlier this year that several attacks had been prevented only because allied intelligence services operating under broader authorities provided Germany with relevant information.
For decades, such cooperation was viewed primarily as a strength of the transatlantic alliance.
It still is.
But Berlin increasingly believes that cooperation cannot substitute for national capability.
Germany’s strategic relationship with the United States remains fundamental to its security, particularly through NATO. Yet growing uncertainty surrounding the long-term direction of American foreign and defence policy has strengthened European discussions about strategic autonomy.
Intelligence has become an important part of that debate.
A European country capable of spending more on defence but still dependent on Washington for critical intelligence would remain strategically constrained. Building stronger national intelligence capabilities is therefore increasingly seen in Berlin as a necessary complement to Germany’s military expansion.
The challenge extends beyond collecting more information.
Modern intelligence increasingly requires access to enormous quantities of digital data, the ability to identify patterns across communications networks and the technological capacity to respond rapidly to cyber operations conducted from infrastructure spread across multiple jurisdictions.
Artificial intelligence is expected to play a growing role in that process.
The proposed German reforms would permit intelligence agencies to use advanced automated tools to analyse data and identify potential security threats more efficiently. Such technology could be particularly valuable when investigating networks involved in cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns or covert foreign influence.
But it also introduces another layer of political controversy.
Automated analysis of communications and behavioural data can dramatically increase intelligence capacity, while simultaneously raising questions about false identification, mass surveillance and accountability.
Germany will therefore have to reconcile two priorities that are increasingly in tension: maintaining one of Europe’s strongest legal traditions of privacy protection while constructing an intelligence apparatus capable of confronting technologically sophisticated adversaries.
The Russian challenge has made that debate considerably more urgent.
Hybrid warfare is attractive precisely because it exploits the openness and complexity of democratic societies. Telecommunications systems, transport infrastructure, political institutions, media networks and private companies can all become potential targets.
The attacks can also be relatively inexpensive compared with conventional military operations while generating significant economic and political disruption.
Germany’s industrial importance adds another dimension.
The country hosts major defence manufacturers, advanced engineering companies, energy infrastructure, research institutions and logistics networks supporting NATO and Ukraine. Russian intelligence has consequently shown particular interest in German industry and business leadership.
In June, reporting indicated that the BND had warned major German companies about growing threats connected to the confrontation with Russia, including risks to senior executives.
Protecting such assets requires cooperation among foreign intelligence, domestic security agencies, police, military authorities and private companies.
Berlin has already begun strengthening that coordination. Germany launched a joint intelligence centre in June dedicated to hybrid threats, bringing security institutions together to improve their ability to detect espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks and foreign interference.
The new intelligence legislation would add considerably stronger operational tools to that architecture.
Taken together, the measures point toward a broader transformation in Germany’s conception of national security.
For much of the post-Cold War period, the country could afford to treat intelligence primarily as a supporting function within a security system heavily anchored by the United States and NATO.
That assumption is changing.
Berlin now faces a Russia willing to employ military power alongside covert operations, cyberattacks and political interference. At the same time, Germany is being pressed to assume greater responsibility for European defence and become capable of operating with less automatic reliance on American capabilities.
The result is an intelligence system being redesigned for an era of strategic competition.
Germany’s dilemma is that strengthening the state’s capacity to confront external threats inevitably creates greater powers that can also affect citizens at home. The political success of the reform will therefore depend not only on whether German intelligence becomes more effective, but on whether parliament and the courts consider the accompanying safeguards sufficient.
Yet the direction of travel is increasingly clear.
The security environment surrounding Germany has changed more rapidly than the institutions designed to protect it. Berlin’s latest reforms represent an attempt to close that gap.
Russia’s hybrid campaign has provided the immediate catalyst, but the implications extend considerably further. Germany is gradually accepting that economic power, military spending and diplomatic influence cannot provide genuine strategic autonomy without an intelligence system capable of independently identifying — and increasingly disrupting — threats.
For a country that deliberately kept its spies on a short leash for decades, that represents a profound change.
