Taiwan’s vice president has carried one of the island’s most sensitive diplomatic messages into the heart of Europe, using a democracy conference in Italy to demonstrate how far Taipei’s unofficial relationships have expanded even as most European governments continue to recognise Beijing rather than Taiwan. Hsiao Bi-khim’s appearance on the island of Ventotene, accompanied by Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung, prompted a formal protest from China to both Italy and the European Union. Rome deliberately kept official distance from the delegation, but the visit nevertheless marked another step in Taiwan’s attempt to turn political sympathy, economic interdependence and shared concerns about authoritarian pressure into a wider international presence.
A visit designed to be noticed without becoming official
The trip was unusual less because Taiwanese officials were in Europe than because of the rank of the visitor. Taiwan’s foreign ministers and other senior figures periodically travel to countries that do not maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, often for parliamentary events, economic forums or meetings with political parties and civil society. A serving vice president is different. Hsiao is Taiwan’s second-highest elected official and one of the most internationally recognisable figures in President Lai Ching-te’s administration. Her presence inevitably carries more political weight and creates a more difficult calculation for any European host government.
Taiwan’s presidential office confirmed that Hsiao had been invited to the Second Ventotene European Conference for Freedom and Democracy, held from September 10 to 12, and that Foreign Minister Lin was travelling with her. European Parliament Vice President Pina Picierno, one of the main organisers, said Hsiao’s participation had been kept confidential until her arrival so that the visit could proceed without interference. That secrecy was itself a measure of the diplomatic sensitivity surrounding the event. It also became part of the political message once the delegation was safely in Italy: Taiwan’s supporters were signalling that pressure from Beijing would not determine who could participate in a European discussion about democracy.
Italy, however, drew a clear line between allowing the conference to take place and transforming the visit into an official bilateral engagement. Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani was not scheduled to meet the Taiwanese delegation, and people familiar with the arrangements told Reuters there were no plans for meetings in the office of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The result was a carefully calibrated diplomatic scene. Taiwan’s vice president could appear on Italian soil, European political figures could welcome her, and China could register its objection, while the Italian government avoided any step that might be interpreted as formal recognition or an upgrade in state-to-state relations.
Beijing responds with a familiar warning
China’s reaction was swift. Beijing says Taiwan is part of China and opposes official contacts between Taiwanese leaders and governments that maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic. The Chinese foreign ministry said it had lodged formal representations with both Italy and the European Union over Hsiao’s visit. Spokesperson Mao Ning accused Taiwan’s governing Democratic Progressive Party of using democracy and freedom as a pretext to seek international support for what Beijing describes as separatism, and urged the relevant European parties to uphold the one-China principle.
The language was consistent with China’s long-standing response to high-level Taiwanese travel, but the target was significant. Beijing was not protesting only to an individual European government. It was also directing its complaint toward the European Union at a time when EU-China relations are already burdened by trade disputes, economic-security concerns, disagreements over Russia’s war against Ukraine and anxiety about instability in the Indo-Pacific. A visit that in another era might have been treated as a narrow sovereignty dispute therefore landed in a much broader strategic argument about Europe’s relationship with China.
China’s position is that countries recognising Beijing have accepted the political foundation on which relations rest and should not conduct official exchanges with Taiwan. European governments generally recognise the People’s Republic of China and do not maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei, but their practical interpretation of that policy leaves room for substantial unofficial ties. Trade offices, parliamentary exchanges, business missions, cultural contacts and technical dialogues have all expanded without formal recognition. The dispute over Hsiao’s trip illustrates the widening gap between Beijing’s preferred interpretation of diplomatic restraint and Europe’s increasingly active informal engagement with Taiwan.
Why Hsiao matters more than an ordinary delegation
Hsiao’s personal profile makes the trip particularly consequential. Before becoming vice president in May 2024, she served as Taiwan’s representative in Washington from 2020 to 2023, effectively functioning as the island’s top envoy to the United States despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations. Earlier in her career she served multiple terms in Taiwan’s legislature and held senior positions in the Democratic Progressive Party’s international affairs apparatus. She speaks fluent English and has spent much of her career building political networks outside Taiwan.
That background gives her unusual credibility in conversations with Western politicians. It also makes her a prominent target of Beijing. Chinese authorities have previously sanctioned Hsiao and have described her as a supporter of Taiwan independence. Taipei rejects Beijing’s claim that the island’s democratic government is subordinate to the People’s Republic and argues that Taiwan’s future can be decided only by its people. President Lai’s administration has broadly maintained that position while trying to deepen links with partners that share concerns about coercion, disinformation and the security of critical supply chains.
Hsiao’s diplomatic style has often been associated with patient relationship-building rather than theatrical confrontation. That approach is visible in the European strategy now taking shape. Taiwan is not asking Italy or the European Union for immediate formal recognition, an outcome that is politically unrealistic and would provoke a severe Chinese reaction. Instead, it is seeking incremental gains: more senior visits, more regular political access, stronger parliamentary support, deeper economic cooperation, closer coordination on technology and a more explicit European interest in preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait. Each individual step may appear modest. Taken together, they gradually enlarge Taiwan’s international room for manoeuvre.
Ventotene gave the visit unusual symbolism
The location carried symbolic weight. Ventotene occupies a special place in the history of European integration because anti-fascist intellectuals Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi wrote the Ventotene Manifesto while confined on the island during Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship. The text became one of the intellectual reference points for the idea of a federal Europe built to prevent the return of nationalism and war. Holding a conference on freedom and democracy there allows organisers to connect contemporary political struggles with one of Europe’s foundational narratives.
For Taiwan, that symbolism is useful. Taipei increasingly presents its international case not only in terms of sovereignty or strategic geography but also as a question of democratic resilience. Taiwan is a pluralist democracy with competitive elections, a lively press and a highly mobilised civil society. Its government argues that the pressure it faces from Beijing should therefore be understood by Europeans as part of a wider contest over whether authoritarian powers can restrict the international space available to democratic societies.
That framing has gained greater resonance in Europe since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. European policymakers have become more attentive to economic coercion, foreign interference, cyber pressure, disinformation and the vulnerability created by dependence on authoritarian states. Taiwan’s circumstances are different from Ukraine’s, and European governments are careful not to collapse the two cases into a single analogy. Yet the war in Europe has changed the political vocabulary through which Taiwan is discussed. Questions that once seemed remote — energy dependence, supply-chain concentration, hybrid pressure and the strategic consequences of allowing coercion to succeed — now feel much more immediate in European capitals.
Europe’s one-China policy is not Beijing’s one-China principle
One of the most important distinctions in the dispute is often blurred in public debate. The European Union and its member states recognise the government of the People’s Republic of China, but that does not mean they accept every element of Beijing’s position on Taiwan. European governments pursue their own one-China policies, which generally allow for extensive unofficial relations with Taipei. Beijing, by contrast, promotes what it calls the one-China principle, under which Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and foreign governments should avoid actions that could imply otherwise.
That difference creates the diplomatic space in which visits such as Hsiao’s can occur. Italy can maintain formal relations with Beijing, avoid official government meetings with Taiwan’s vice president and still permit political figures and civil-society organisers to host her at a conference. The European Parliament can develop strong ties with Taiwanese lawmakers and officials even though the European Union does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state. European officials can call for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait without endorsing Taipei’s formal independence.
For Beijing, however, the accumulation of such contacts matters. China’s concern is not only legal recognition but political normalisation. If senior Taiwanese officials can travel routinely across Europe, speak at influential institutions and develop relationships with governments and parliaments, Taiwan gains many of the practical advantages of diplomacy even without embassies. China therefore has an incentive to make each visit costly enough that European hosts reconsider future invitations. Taiwan and its supporters have the opposite objective: to make such engagement ordinary enough that Chinese objections lose their deterrent force.
A relationship increasingly anchored in economics
The political debate is reinforced by a substantial economic relationship. European Commission data show that Taiwan was the European Union’s thirteenth-largest trading partner in 2025. Total trade in goods reached €76.2 billion, with EU exports to Taiwan worth €30.9 billion and imports from Taiwan worth €45.3 billion. That left the EU with a €14.4 billion trade deficit. Taiwan, in turn, counted the European Union as its fifth-largest trading partner after China, the United States, Japan and South Korea.
The composition of that trade explains why Taiwan has become more important to European economic-security planning. Machinery and transport equipment dominate commerce in both directions, reflecting the island’s central role in electronics and advanced manufacturing. Taiwan’s semiconductor industry sits near the core of global supply chains for computers, telecommunications, artificial intelligence, automobiles and industrial equipment. Europe’s digital ambitions and its efforts to build greater technological sovereignty therefore intersect directly with the stability of Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific.
Investment ties have also deepened. At the fourth EU-Taiwan Trade and Investment Dialogue in December 2025, the European Commission said the EU remained Taiwan’s main source of foreign direct investment stocks and flows. Taiwanese investment in the European Union had nearly tripled between 2020 and 2024, reaching about €14 billion by June 2025. The two sides have discussed semiconductor supply chains, economic security, offshore wind investment and market access. Those channels give the relationship a durable institutional base that exists independently of headline-grabbing political visits.
Semiconductors turn geography into European interest
Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance has transformed the island from a distant geopolitical concern into a direct economic interest for Europe. Advanced chips are embedded in almost every major modern industrial system. A serious disruption in the Taiwan Strait would not be confined to Asian markets; it would affect European automakers, telecommunications companies, defence industries, data centres, medical-equipment manufacturers and consumer electronics. The semiconductor shortages experienced during the pandemic already demonstrated how quickly relatively small interruptions can cascade through production networks.
Europe has responded by trying to diversify and localise parts of the chip supply chain, including through the EU Chips Act and investments in fabrication capacity. Taiwanese companies are part of that strategy. The objective is not to replace Taiwan’s role in the global industry, which would be extraordinarily difficult, but to reduce the scale of Europe’s exposure to a single geographic flashpoint. This creates a paradox. The more Europe tries to hedge against a Taiwan crisis, the more closely it must cooperate with Taiwanese technology companies and policymakers.
That economic reality inevitably affects diplomacy. European governments may wish to keep political relations with Taipei unofficial, yet they increasingly need sustained channels for discussing investment screening, export controls, supply-chain resilience, cyber security and industrial policy. Taiwan is no longer simply a question for foreign ministries. It is relevant to finance ministries, trade departments, technology regulators, defence planners and corporate boards. The diplomatic relationship is becoming broader because the practical stakes are broader.
The EU has been sharpening its language on the Taiwan Strait
European institutions have also become more explicit about the security dimension. In March, during EU-China security and defence consultations in Brussels, the European Union raised concerns about increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, including in the Taiwan Strait. In June, an EU-South Korea summit declaration stressed the importance of preserving peace and stability across the strait and opposed unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Indo-Pacific. Such language does not amount to a European security guarantee for Taiwan, but it signals that the issue is no longer treated as a purely bilateral matter between Beijing and Taipei.
The European interest is practical. A conflict would threaten maritime trade, supply chains and financial markets on a scale that would reach Europe almost immediately. It could also force European governments to make difficult choices about sanctions, export controls and support for allies. Even without a full-scale war, coercive measures such as blockades, large military exercises or restrictions on shipping could create severe economic consequences.
For that reason, European policy increasingly emphasises the status quo: no unilateral change, no use of force, continued dialogue and open sea lanes. Taiwan regards such statements as valuable because they internationalise the cost of coercion. China often objects that foreign governments are interfering in an internal matter. The gap between those views is likely to persist. The more Europe defines stability in the Taiwan Strait as a global public good, the harder it becomes for European governments to remain politically detached from cross-strait tensions.
Ukraine changed the political conversation
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally altered Europe’s assumptions about economic interdependence and geopolitical risk. Before 2022, many European governments believed deep commercial ties could moderate strategic rivalry. The war exposed the limits of that assumption. Europe’s dependence on Russian energy became an urgent security vulnerability, while sanctions and export controls showed how quickly economic relationships could be subordinated to strategic priorities.
Taiwan has drawn clear lessons from that experience and has sought to present itself as part of a wider democratic network facing pressure from authoritarian powers. European officials, meanwhile, increasingly examine their exposure to China through the language of “de-risking” rather than simple engagement. The EU does not seek wholesale economic separation from China, which remains one of its largest trading partners, but it has placed greater emphasis on critical technologies, investment screening, export controls, supply-chain diversification and resilience against economic coercion.
The Taiwan issue sits directly inside that debate. European governments want stable commercial ties with China and have no interest in provoking a confrontation. At the same time, they are less willing than before to assume that economic interdependence alone will prevent a crisis. Hsiao’s visit therefore resonates with a Europe already asking how democracies should manage strategic dependence and external pressure. The argument in Ventotene was about freedom and political participation, but the broader context includes factories, shipping lanes, energy security, technology and defence.
Italy is balancing principles, commerce and risk
Italy’s handling of the trip reflected the broader European balancing act. Rome allowed the visit and did not attempt to prevent Hsiao’s participation in a political conference, yet the government avoided official meetings that could have escalated the dispute with Beijing. That separation between political openness and diplomatic caution is likely to remain the preferred model for many EU states.
Italy has substantial economic interests in China and must manage its position within a European Union that is simultaneously trying to protect industrial competitiveness and reduce strategic vulnerabilities. Rome also has an interest in deeper ties with Taiwan’s technology sector. Italy and Taiwan maintain de facto representative offices, and direct air connections illustrate the practical relationship that exists beneath the absence of formal diplomatic recognition. Businesses, universities and political institutions can cooperate without changing the formal diplomatic framework.
The challenge for Italy is that Beijing may increasingly treat unofficial engagement as politically consequential. If China responds to future Taiwanese visits with economic pressure or diplomatic retaliation, Rome will face harder choices. The same is true for smaller European states, which may be more vulnerable to coercion. The question is whether EU members will respond individually or develop a more coordinated approach to high-level Taiwanese contacts. A common framework could reduce Beijing’s ability to pressure countries one at a time, but it would also require member states to agree on how far they are prepared to go.
The European Parliament has become a key platform
Taiwan has found particularly receptive partners in the European Parliament. Unlike national governments, which must manage formal diplomatic relations and the immediate consequences of state-to-state friction with Beijing, parliamentarians have greater freedom to engage Taiwanese officials. They can invite speakers, pass resolutions, organise delegations and raise human-rights or security issues without necessarily changing official recognition policy.
Hsiao used that opening in November 2025 when she spoke at the annual summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China held at the European Parliament in Brussels. That appearance was itself rare for a serving Taiwanese vice president and demonstrated the growing willingness of European lawmakers to provide platforms to senior officials from Taipei. The Ventotene trip extends that pattern beyond Brussels and into a broader network of democracy-focused political engagement.
For Taiwan, parliamentary diplomacy has two advantages. First, it builds relationships across party lines and national borders, creating a reservoir of support that can influence future government policy. Second, it makes Taiwan visible in European domestic politics rather than confining the relationship to specialist diplomatic channels. Beijing understands those advantages and has frequently criticised European lawmakers who deepen ties with Taipei. The contest is therefore partly about institutions: China works through state diplomacy, while Taiwan increasingly relies on a network that includes parliaments, political parties, think tanks, civil society, universities and businesses.
Human rights provide another channel for engagement
The relationship is also being institutionalised through policy dialogues that do not depend on formal recognition. In April 2026, the European Union and Taiwan held their eighth Human Rights Consultations in Brussels. The two sides discussed democracy, rule of law, migrant workers, gender equality, digital rights, media freedom and business responsibilities. The EU also used the talks to raise concerns of its own, including its opposition to the death penalty and the treatment of migrant workers in Taiwan.
That exchange is important because it shows that European engagement with Taiwan is not simply strategic alignment against China. The EU treats Taiwan as a democratic partner but still applies its own human-rights standards and raises areas of disagreement. This gives the relationship a degree of political substance that goes beyond symbolic support. Taiwan, in turn, benefits from being treated as a normal participant in international policy discussions even when formal diplomatic status remains unresolved.
The Ventotene conference fits naturally into that architecture. By placing Taiwan within a conversation about democracy rather than recognition, organisers reduce the importance of formal statehood while increasing the political legitimacy of Taiwan’s participation. Beijing rejects that distinction, arguing that democracy cannot be used to circumvent the one-China principle. European supporters of Taiwan make the opposite case: that participation in democratic debate should not be subject to veto by an external government. The disagreement is therefore not only territorial; it is also about who controls access to international political space.
China still possesses powerful leverage in Europe
Despite Taiwan’s gains, it would be a mistake to interpret Hsiao’s visit as evidence that Europe is moving toward formal recognition. China remains a much larger economic partner for the European Union, and European governments have strong incentives to preserve workable relations with Beijing. Cooperation with China is important on trade, climate, global finance, non-proliferation and numerous diplomatic crises. European companies also retain major commercial exposure to the Chinese market.
Beijing can therefore impose real costs when it believes a country has crossed a political line. In past disputes involving Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong or criticism of Chinese policy, governments and companies have faced diplomatic freezes, trade restrictions, consumer boycotts or reduced access. Even the possibility of retaliation can shape decision-making. That is one reason why high-level Taiwanese visits are often arranged discreetly and why governments distinguish carefully between private, parliamentary and official contact.
China’s leverage, however, is not unlimited. The European Union has become more willing to confront economic coercion and has developed instruments intended to protect member states from external pressure. European concerns about Chinese industrial overcapacity, subsidies, market access and support for Russia have also reduced the political appetite for accommodation at any price. Beijing still matters enormously, but European leaders increasingly ask whether excessive caution simply encourages more pressure. That changing calculation creates opportunities for Taiwan.
Taiwan is pursuing diplomatic depth rather than diplomatic recognition
Taiwan today has only a small number of formal diplomatic allies. That numerical reality has forced Taipei to develop an alternative model of international engagement. Instead of measuring success solely by embassies and recognition, Taiwan increasingly focuses on the quality of its unofficial relationships with major democracies. The United States, Japan and European countries do not formally recognise Taiwan, yet their economic, political and security interactions with the island can be far more consequential than many of Taipei’s formal diplomatic ties.
The strategy is pragmatic. Formal recognition by a major European state would trigger a severe crisis with China and is not presently realistic. But deeper trade, more parliamentary engagement, technology investment, academic exchanges and high-level unofficial visits are achievable. Each strengthens Taiwan’s resilience and increases the number of actors with a stake in the island’s stability.
Hsiao’s trip exemplifies that approach. She did not arrive in Rome for a state visit, was not received by Italy’s prime minister or foreign minister and did not alter the legal framework of Italy-China relations. Yet she appeared at a prominent European democracy conference alongside Taiwan’s foreign minister, generated support from senior European Parliament figures and forced Beijing to respond publicly. From Taipei’s perspective, that is diplomatic depth: the ability to participate, build networks and shape debate without waiting for formal recognition that may never come.
For Europe, the question is how much ambiguity remains sustainable
Europe has benefited for decades from a form of strategic ambiguity around Taiwan. Governments could recognise Beijing, trade with Taiwan, avoid taking a position on sovereignty and assume that cross-strait tensions would remain manageable. That arrangement is becoming harder to sustain as economic and security interests grow. The more important Taiwan becomes to European technology and supply chains, the more European governments must plan for scenarios they would prefer never to face.
This does not necessarily mean Europe will adopt a more confrontational posture toward China. On the contrary, many European leaders will continue to emphasise dialogue and restraint. But dialogue itself requires clearer definitions of what Europe considers acceptable. If Beijing expects European countries to reduce even unofficial contact with Taiwan, while European parliaments and political actors seek to expand it, recurrent disputes are inevitable.
The same tension applies to military activity around the island. Europe has no unified commitment to defend Taiwan, and its armed forces have limited capacity in East Asia compared with the United States and regional powers. Yet EU statements increasingly describe peace in the Taiwan Strait as important to European interests. That raises a question policymakers cannot postpone indefinitely: what political or economic response would follow if the status quo were changed by coercion? The answer remains uncertain, and that uncertainty is itself part of the current deterrence equation.
The next test will be whether rare visits become routine
The immediate diplomatic crisis around Ventotene may fade quickly. Italy has preserved its formal position, China has registered its protest, and the conference has ended. The more consequential question is whether Hsiao’s appearance becomes a precedent. If other European institutions invite her, if Taiwanese ministers travel more frequently and if governments tolerate those contacts despite Chinese objections, the political landscape will shift even without any dramatic announcement.
Normalization is often more important than symbolism in diplomacy. A single visit can be dismissed as exceptional. Repeated visits create expectations, networks and procedures. Officials learn how to manage security, protocol and communication. Host governments become less alarmed by predictable Chinese protests. Media coverage becomes less focused on whether a Taiwanese leader is “allowed” to appear and more focused on what they are discussing. That is precisely why Beijing contests these occasions so strongly and why Taiwan invests so much effort in making them possible.
The European Parliament is likely to remain an important arena, but national capitals will determine the ultimate ceiling of engagement. If governments continue to separate unofficial political contact from formal recognition, senior Taiwanese visits could expand gradually. If China demonstrates that it is prepared to impose significant economic costs, some states may become more cautious. The balance will vary across Europe, producing a patchwork of relationships rather than a single unified approach.
A small island at the centre of a larger strategic argument
Hsiao Bi-khim’s trip to Italy was brief, carefully managed and formally unofficial. Yet it captured several of the most important forces reshaping relations between Europe and Asia. Taiwan is trying to escape diplomatic isolation without provoking a crisis. China is trying to prevent unofficial engagement from becoming a substitute for recognition. Europe is trying to preserve commercial ties with Beijing while reducing strategic dependence and defending its freedom to choose whom its political institutions engage.
Those objectives increasingly collide. Taiwan’s economic importance makes it difficult for Europe to treat the island as marginal. China’s economic weight makes it impossible for European governments to ignore Beijing’s reaction. The war in Ukraine has made questions of coercion, resilience and dependence more urgent. Semiconductor supply chains have connected East Asian security directly to European industry. Democratic institutions have created channels of engagement that formal diplomacy cannot fully control.
Ventotene therefore mattered less as a destination than as a signal. Taiwan’s vice president was able to enter a major European country, participate in a conference organised around freedom and democracy, appear with senior political supporters and return the Taiwan question to the centre of Europe’s strategic debate. Italy preserved diplomatic distance, but it did not prevent the visit. China protested, but it could not stop the event from taking place.
For Taipei, that is evidence that the space for unofficial diplomacy is widening. For Beijing, it is a warning that political isolation is becoming harder to enforce. For Europe, it is another reminder that the Taiwan Strait is no longer a remote issue that can be separated neatly from the continent’s economic and security choices.
The next phase will not necessarily be marked by dramatic recognitions or formal alliances. It is more likely to unfold through incremental decisions: who receives Taiwanese officials, which institutions invite them, how often European leaders speak about the Taiwan Strait, where semiconductor investments are made and whether member states coordinate when Beijing objects. Hsiao’s appearance in Italy was one such decision. Its significance lies in the possibility that, before long, it may no longer seem exceptional.
