The break between Jarosław Kaczyński and former prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki threatens to divide conservative voters and strengthen Donald Tusk’s position before Poland’s 2027 parliamentary election.
Poland’s once-dominant conservative movement has entered its most serious internal crisis in years after a confrontation between Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński and former prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki triggered a major rupture within the country’s largest opposition party.
More than 30 Law and Justice lawmakers were declared to have effectively left the party after refusing to sign statements restricting their participation in outside political organisations. Some reports placed the number of departing or threatened parliamentarians at more than 40 when members of the European Parliament and the Senate were included.
The dispute centres on Development Plus, an association established by Morawiecki and his allies in April. Although the former prime minister presented the organisation as a platform for developing economic policy and broadening the conservative movement’s appeal, Kaczyński’s supporters viewed it as the foundation of a rival political structure.
Kaczyński demanded that Law and Justice members choose between participation in Development Plus and continued membership in the party. After dozens declined to sign the required declarations, the veteran party leader announced that they had made their choice and could no longer be considered members of Law and Justice.
Morawiecki rejected that interpretation, arguing that he and his supporters had not voluntarily resigned. He said his faction had continued seeking a compromise until the final hours and maintained that an independent policy association should not automatically be treated as a competing political party.
The confrontation marks a dramatic deterioration in relations between two figures who once stood at the centre of the same governing project. Kaczyński has led Law and Justice for more than two decades and remains the principal architect of Poland’s national-conservative movement. Morawiecki, a former banker and finance minister, served as prime minister from 2017 until the party lost power following the 2023 parliamentary election.
Their disagreement extends beyond personal rivalry. It reflects a deeper argument over how Poland’s conservative opposition should respond to its electoral defeat and prepare for the parliamentary contest expected in 2027.
Morawiecki and his allies have advocated a more modernising, economically focused programme designed to appeal to entrepreneurs, younger voters, urban professionals and sections of the political centre. They have argued that Law and Justice cannot return to power by relying exclusively on its traditional electorate or by competing with increasingly radical parties on the nationalist right.
Kaczyński’s faction has favoured maintaining a harder ideological position based on national sovereignty, social conservatism, scepticism toward deeper European integration and strong opposition to Donald Tusk’s pro-European government. The party leadership has also faced pressure from farther-right formations that have attracted voters dissatisfied with both Poland’s established conservative and liberal parties.
The split therefore presents a strategic dilemma. A more moderate platform could help Morawiecki reach voters uncomfortable with Kaczyński’s confrontational political style. At the same time, a separate Morawiecki-led movement could divide the conservative vote, leaving both factions weaker under Poland’s parliamentary electoral system.
For Prime Minister Donald Tusk, the rupture offers an important political opportunity. His Civic Coalition-led government remains under pressure over living costs, public services, coalition disagreements and the slow implementation of some of its promised institutional reforms. Yet a fragmented opposition could make it substantially more difficult for the right to assemble the parliamentary majority needed to remove him from office.
Law and Justice currently holds 186 of the 460 seats in the Sejm, making it the largest individual opposition force but leaving it well short of a governing majority. Losing dozens of lawmakers would reduce its parliamentary strength and undermine its claim to be the undisputed leader of the conservative camp.
The upheaval is particularly significant because Poland’s right demonstrated its continuing electoral strength in the 2025 presidential election. Karol Nawrocki, who was supported by Law and Justice, narrowly won the presidency, giving conservatives control of an institution capable of delaying or blocking parts of Tusk’s legislative agenda.
Nawrocki’s victory suggested that a united conservative bloc could remain highly competitive even after losing the national government. The new division, however, raises questions about whether that presidential success can be converted into a parliamentary victory.
It also complicates relations between the opposition and the Presidential Palace. Nawrocki benefited from Law and Justice’s organisation and voter base, but as president he has sought to establish an independent political identity. A prolonged conflict between Kaczyński and Morawiecki could force him to decide whether to support one faction, remain neutral or attempt to act as a mediator across the conservative movement.
The dispute had been building for several months. In April, Kaczyński warned that politicians associated with Morawiecki’s new organisation might be excluded from future Law and Justice electoral lists. Morawiecki initially dismissed reports of a split as little more than “communications turbulence,” while senior party figures publicly claimed that an agreement could still be reached.
Those efforts ultimately failed. The loyalty declaration turned an internal disagreement into an explicit test of authority, leaving little room for compromise without either Kaczyński or Morawiecki appearing to retreat.
For Kaczyński, tolerating Development Plus risked allowing a parallel centre of power to emerge inside the party. For Morawiecki, accepting the ultimatum would have meant surrendering the organisational network and policy platform that could support his ambitions to reshape—or eventually lead—the Polish right.
The former prime minister has said he is not currently planning to create a new political party. Nevertheless, the size of the group aligned with him gives the faction the personnel and parliamentary presence necessary to form a new organisation should reconciliation prove impossible.
A separate Morawiecki movement could seek to occupy the space between Tusk’s liberal-centrist coalition and Kaczyński’s national conservatism. Its appeal would probably depend on whether voters continue to associate Morawiecki with the achievements of the former Law and Justice government or instead hold him responsible for its controversies and defeat.
During its years in power, Law and Justice expanded family benefits, raised social spending and built strong support in smaller towns and rural regions. It also faced criticism over judicial changes, pressure on public media, disputes with the European Union and the concentration of political authority within state institutions.
Morawiecki was deeply involved in that government and cannot easily separate himself from its record. His economic credentials and more polished international image may nevertheless allow him to present himself as a pragmatic conservative capable of repairing relations with business and selected European partners without abandoning nationalist priorities.
The emerging split may also benefit smaller right-wing parties. Libertarian, nationalist and far-right groups have already gained support among younger voters, particularly those dissatisfied with Law and Justice’s economic interventionism and ageing leadership. A weakened PiS could lose voters on both its moderate and radical flanks.
That fragmentation would make coalition-building after the 2027 election more unpredictable. Law and Justice could be forced to negotiate with harder-line parties that differ from it on economic policy, relations with Ukraine and Poland’s role in the European Union. Morawiecki’s faction, meanwhile, might have to choose between cooperating with its former party or becoming a potential coalition partner for more centrist forces.
Tusk’s government cannot assume that the conservative crisis guarantees its re-election. Poland remains deeply polarised, and the governing coalition includes parties with different positions on taxation, abortion, social policy and the pace of institutional reform.
The prime minister also faces resistance from President Nawrocki, whose veto power can obstruct legislation unless the government secures a sufficiently large parliamentary majority. Nawrocki’s election demonstrated continuing dissatisfaction with Tusk’s administration and showed that conservative candidates remain capable of mobilising a broad electorate.
However, parliamentary elections reward organisational unity, disciplined candidate selection and effective coordination across electoral districts. A divided opposition may struggle to provide all three.
The crisis also carries symbolic importance. For much of the past decade, Law and Justice succeeded in consolidating Poland’s conservative electorate under a single political banner. Its discipline allowed the party to survive scandals, international criticism and leadership tensions while retaining a loyal base.
The open break between Kaczyński and Morawiecki suggests that this model may be reaching its limits. The party is no longer only debating how to defeat Donald Tusk; it is confronting the question of who will inherit leadership of the Polish right after Kaczyński.
At 77 in 2026, Kaczyński remains the central authority within Law and Justice, but uncertainty over succession has intensified factional competition. Morawiecki is among the most prominent potential successors, yet his attempt to build an independent network appears to have convinced the leadership that he was preparing to challenge the existing hierarchy.
Whether the rupture becomes permanent will depend on negotiations over the coming weeks, including control of parliamentary positions, access to party resources and the future status of lawmakers aligned with Development Plus.
A reconciliation remains theoretically possible, particularly if opinion polls show that both sides would suffer heavily by competing separately. Yet the public nature of the accusations and the loyalty ultimatum will make restoring trust difficult.
For now, Poland’s conservative opposition enters the pre-election period divided between competing strategies, personalities and visions of its future. The conflict gives Donald Tusk valuable political breathing room, but it also signals the beginning of a broader realignment whose outcome could reshape Poland’s party system well beyond the 2027 vote.
