Péter Magyar says his talks with Ursula von der Leyen were successful, but billions in frozen EU funds still depend on fast rule-of-law reforms in Budapest.
BRUSSELS/BUDAPEST, MAY 1, 2026
Hungary’s long argument with Brussels has moved from veto theatre to legislative mechanics. Less than three weeks after Péter Magyar’s Tisza party swept Viktor Orbán from power, the incoming prime minister used his first high-profile Brussels visit to tell Hungarians that the frozen money which became a symbol of the Orbán era could soon start flowing again. The tone was deliberately upbeat. Magyar called his meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen “extremely constructive and successful,” and said he expected to return in late May to seal a political agreement.
The phrase that matters now, however, is not “successful talks.” It is “legal changes.” The European Commission froze Hungary’s access to large parts of its EU envelope because it found that Orbán’s government had undermined the rule of law, weakened checks on public spending and failed to meet anti-corruption safeguards. That dispute hardened into one of the EU’s defining internal battles: a member state accused of democratic backsliding, a bloc reluctant to finance systems it considered compromised, and Hungarian municipalities, universities and businesses caught between Brussels pressure and Budapest politics.
Magyar has inherited both the opportunity and the deadline. Roughly €17 billion remains blocked, including pandemic recovery funds that must be drawn before the summer deadline or risk being lost. Officials in Brussels believe his two-thirds parliamentary majority gives him something Orbán’s opponents rarely possessed: the raw constitutional power to move quickly. That majority may allow Tisza to rewrite laws, restructure oversight bodies and address judicial and anti-corruption milestones without relying on the outgoing ruling party. Yet Brussels is not offering an automatic pardon. The Commission wants verifiable reforms before it authorises disbursements.
Von der Leyen’s public message was warm but conditional. She said the two sides had discussed the steps needed to unlock money frozen over corruption and rule-of-law concerns. In diplomatic terms, that was encouragement with a lock still on the door. The Commission has political reasons to help a post-Orbán Hungary re-anchor itself in the European mainstream, especially after years in which Budapest obstructed EU decisions on Ukraine, sanctions and institutional policy. But it also has institutional reasons not to appear soft. If billions are released before durable safeguards are in place, the EU’s rule-of-law mechanism will look like a bargaining chip rather than a binding standard.
That is why the next month may matter more than the Brussels photo-op. Magyar’s team is expected to focus on public procurement transparency, anti-corruption enforcement, judicial independence, media and academic freedoms, and possibly Hungary’s accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Joining that body would be a sharp symbolic break with Orbán, whose government cast the prosecutor’s office as an intrusion on sovereignty. For Magyar, it could be proof that sovereignty and scrutiny need not be opposites. It would also give EU fraud investigators a stronger channel into cases involving European money in Hungary.
The challenge is that the reform agenda is crowded and the institutional terrain remains mined. Sixteen years of Fidesz rule placed loyalists or allies across the state: prosecutors, regulators, auditors, courts, the media authority and much of the public-administration machinery. Even a supermajority cannot instantly rebuild trust in a state apparatus whose independence Brussels has questioned for years. Nor can Magyar simply purge institutions in the name of restoring the rule of law without inviting the accusation that he is using Orbán’s methods in reverse. His pledge to restore checks and balances will be tested not by speeches but by personnel decisions, procedural restraint and the sequencing of laws.
On paper, the reform menu is no mystery. Hungary’s recovery plan already contains anti-corruption and rule-of-law milestones negotiated under the previous government, including stronger conflict-of-interest rules, more transparent tendering and safeguards around judicial review. What changes with Magyar is political will. Where Orbán treated compliance as an attack on national sovereignty, the new leadership is framing it as a practical condition for rebuilding public trust and unlocking money that Hungarian taxpayers also helped finance through the EU budget.
There is also an economic urgency that gives the EU leverage but also creates pressure on Brussels to move. Hungary’s economy has suffered from weak investment, inflation aftershocks and the loss of EU financing that normally supports infrastructure, innovation and local development. Municipalities and universities have paid part of the price for a dispute they did not create. If Magyar can show credible reforms, the Commission will be under pressure to ensure ordinary Hungarians see tangible benefits quickly. The reset, in other words, is not only about values. It is about roads, research grants, student exchanges and confidence that Hungary is no longer a financial risk inside the EU budget.
Erasmus and research cooperation are also part of the broader reset. Hungarian universities connected to politically controlled public-interest foundations were cut off from some EU programmes during the Orbán years, a sanction that reached students and researchers far beyond the governing party. Restoring access would carry political weight in a country where younger voters helped drive Tisza’s rise. It would also show that the Commission’s conditionality is reversible: reforms can lead to concrete benefits, not only to fewer penalties.
The Ukraine file may move as well. Orbán’s government repeatedly used its veto power to slow or complicate EU support for Kyiv, often turning Hungary into the bloc’s most predictable spoiler. Magyar has signalled a more constructive line without promising that Budapest will abandon every national reservation. That distinction matters. A post-Orbán Hungary is unlikely to become an automatic vote for every Brussels initiative, but even a shift from obstruction to negotiation would change the chemistry of EU summits.
Still, speed can create its own danger. Laws drafted in haste may satisfy a deadline while leaving loopholes in implementation. New oversight bodies may be formally independent but vulnerable to old networks. Prosecutorial cooperation may improve on paper while major cases remain slow. Brussels will therefore be looking for sequencing, enforcement and institutional durability, not just parliamentary votes. The real test is whether reforms survive the first politically sensitive corruption investigation that touches figures close to the former governing system.
The politics are equally delicate. Magyar must reassure Brussels without looking as though he has outsourced Hungary’s agenda to Brussels. Orbán will remain a powerful opposition figure and is likely to frame any conditions attached to EU funds as foreign tutelage. Tisza’s answer is that the conditions are not punishment but basic governance: independent courts, clean tenders, free institutions and prosecutors able to pursue fraud. Magyar has already argued that the EU is not demanding anything contrary to Hungary’s interests. The line is designed for both audiences: a promise of compliance in Brussels and a claim of national self-repair at home.
If the money is released, it will mark the most concrete sign yet that Hungary’s post-Orbán reset is real. If the reforms stall, the Brussels honeymoon will be brief. For now, the EU sees in Magyar a leader with the mandate to reverse Hungary’s isolation; Magyar sees in the EU funds a way to finance his domestic legitimacy. Their interests overlap, but not perfectly. Brussels needs proof, Budapest needs speed, and the clock on the recovery money is already running.
