New research warns that Europe could rely on the United States for 80% of its liquefied natural gas by 2028, raising concerns over supply concentration, price exposure and strategic autonomy.
Europe’s attempt to free itself from Russian energy dependence is entering a new and more complicated phase. After rapidly cutting Russian gas imports following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European governments are now facing a different strategic risk: growing reliance on liquefied natural gas from the United States.
A new research report cited by Reuters says European countries are forecast to import as much as 80% of their liquefied natural gas supplies from the U.S. by 2028. The United States is already on track to become Europe’s largest gas supplier this year when both LNG and pipeline imports are considered, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
The shift marks one of the most significant changes in Europe’s energy map since the start of the war in Ukraine. Before 2022, Russia was the dominant supplier of gas to the European Union, using pipelines that tied major European economies to Moscow for decades. The war transformed that relationship almost overnight, pushing governments to secure emergency LNG cargoes, expand import terminals and sign new supply arrangements.
That emergency response helped Europe avoid a deeper energy crisis, but it also created a new dependency. Unlike pipeline gas, LNG is traded globally and is more exposed to competition from Asian buyers, shipping constraints and geopolitical shocks. If Europe becomes overwhelmingly dependent on one supplier, even a friendly one, it may face higher vulnerability to price swings, contract disputes or policy changes in Washington.
The warning comes as energy prices remain highly sensitive to instability in the Middle East. Reuters reported that global oil supply is expected to fall below demand this year because of disruption linked to the Iran war, with restrictions around the Strait of Hormuz creating a major supply shock.
European policymakers are already debating how to respond to wartime energy profits. EU energy ministers are discussing a possible tax on windfall profits earned by energy companies from price surges linked to the Iran conflict. Greece’s energy minister confirmed that talks are underway, while Spain said five EU countries support such a measure.
The broader issue is not only the price of gas, but the political meaning of dependence. Europe’s energy strategy is increasingly tied to questions of industrial competitiveness, defense policy and diplomatic leverage. If the continent relies too heavily on imported fossil fuels, it may struggle to protect households from price shocks while also maintaining support for energy-intensive industries such as chemicals, steel, fertilizers and manufacturing.
The implications are especially serious for Germany, Italy and other industrial economies that depend on stable energy costs to remain competitive. Expensive gas can weaken factories, reduce investment and push companies to move production to regions with cheaper power. That risk has become a central concern as Europe tries to compete with the United States and China in clean technology, artificial intelligence and advanced manufacturing.
At the same time, the rise in U.S. LNG imports complicates Europe’s climate agenda. Gas is often described as a transition fuel because it produces fewer emissions than coal, but expanding LNG infrastructure can lock countries into long-term fossil-fuel use. Climate and energy analysts warn that new import terminals and long supply contracts may slow the shift toward renewables, storage and electrification.
For the European Union, the strategic challenge is now clear: replacing Russian gas was necessary, but replacing one dependency with another does not guarantee energy sovereignty. The next phase of policy will likely focus on diversification, faster renewable deployment, grid investment, energy storage and demand reduction.
Europe has already proved it can move quickly when forced by crisis. The question now is whether it can move just as quickly without one — before today’s emergency solution becomes tomorrow’s structural vulnerability.
