Brussels wants tougher defenses for strategic industries, but divisions inside the EU could limit how far it can go
Ursula von der Leyen is preparing for one of the most consequential trade battles of her second mandate: how far Europe should go in protecting its industrial base from China without triggering a wider economic confrontation with Beijing.
The European Commission president has long argued that the EU must reduce its strategic dependencies, defend key industries and respond more forcefully to what Brussels sees as unfair Chinese competition. Now, that position is moving from rhetoric to policy.
EU officials are discussing broader restrictions on Chinese imports, including possible tariffs, quotas and safeguard measures aimed at sectors considered vulnerable to China’s industrial overcapacity. Electric vehicles, clean technologies, chemicals, metals, medical equipment and critical raw materials are all part of a widening debate over whether Europe’s openness has become a strategic weakness.
The concern in Brussels is clear: Chinese companies, supported by state subsidies and massive domestic production capacity, are flooding global markets with low-cost goods. For European policymakers, this is no longer only a commercial dispute. It is a question of industrial survival.
Von der Leyen’s strategy is built around the idea of “de-risking, not decoupling.” The EU does not want to cut ties with China, one of its largest trading partners. But it does want to reduce vulnerabilities in sectors essential to economic security, the green transition and future technological competitiveness.
That approach has already been tested in the electric vehicle sector, where the EU imposed duties on Chinese-made EVs after an anti-subsidy investigation. The case became a symbol of Europe’s new trade posture: more assertive, more defensive and more willing to challenge Beijing when Brussels believes the playing field is distorted.
But the political problem for von der Leyen is that Europe is not united.
France, Italy and Spain have generally pushed for a stronger response to Chinese imports, warning that Europe risks losing factories, jobs and technological capacity. Germany, by contrast, remains more cautious. Its economy is deeply tied to China, with thousands of German companies operating there and major industrial groups relying on Chinese demand, investment and supply chains.
That divide creates a difficult balancing act. If Brussels moves too aggressively, it risks retaliation from Beijing and resistance from EU capitals worried about their exporters. If it moves too slowly, it risks accusations that the Commission is allowing another wave of deindustrialization to hit Europe.
China has already rejected the EU’s arguments, accusing Brussels of using trade data selectively and disguising protectionism as economic security. Beijing has warned that it will defend its interests if the EU expands restrictions, raising the prospect of retaliatory measures against European goods.
The dispute is also unfolding at a sensitive moment for the global economy. The United States has adopted a much harder line on Chinese imports, while Europe is trying to avoid being caught between Washington’s confrontational approach and Beijing’s industrial dominance. Von der Leyen’s challenge is to craft a European path: firmer than before, but not openly hostile.
The stakes go beyond trade balances. Europe’s clean-tech ambitions depend on access to batteries, solar components, rare earths and electric vehicle supply chains—many of which are heavily influenced by China. At the same time, European leaders fear that relying too much on Chinese production could leave the continent exposed in future crises.
This is why the coming debate will be a test not only of von der Leyen’s China policy, but of Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical economic power. The Commission can propose tools, launch investigations and impose measures. But without political unity among member states, its leverage will remain limited.
For von der Leyen, the message is becoming sharper: Europe cannot remain open if its openness is used against it. Yet convincing all 27 member states to accept that logic may prove harder than confronting Beijing itself.
The next phase of EU-China relations will therefore be defined by a delicate question: can Europe protect its industries without closing its economy? Von der Leyen believes it must. But inside the EU, the fight over how to do it has only just begun.
