The European Commission is urging Madrid and Budapest to strengthen lobbying controls, transparency safeguards and enforcement as part of its latest examination of the rule of law across the bloc.
BRUSSELS — The European Commission is preparing to call on Spain and Hungary to tighten their anti-corruption systems, warning that weaknesses in lobbying regulation, public-sector transparency and institutional oversight continue to expose both countries to political influence and conflicts of interest.
The recommendations form part of the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Report, which assesses every European Union member state in four broad areas: the justice system, anti-corruption measures, media freedom and institutional checks and balances. The review draws on information from national authorities, civil society groups, businesses and country visits conducted by Commission officials.
Although Spain and Hungary face markedly different political circumstances, Brussels is expected to identify a common problem: insufficiently robust rules governing contacts between public officials and private interests.
In Spain, the Commission is set to renew pressure on the government to establish a comprehensive national framework for lobbying. Unlike several other EU countries, Spain still lacks a fully operational nationwide register that clearly identifies professional lobbyists, their clients and the public officials they approach.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reported in March that Spain fulfilled only 40 percent of its criteria for lobbying regulation and none of the criteria measuring implementation in practice. It noted that the country had neither general lobbying legislation nor a national lobbying register, despite existing restrictions on senior officials taking private-sector positions immediately after leaving office.
That regulatory gap has become increasingly sensitive amid political disputes and investigations involving people close to the Spanish government. Brussels is not responsible for deciding individual criminal cases, but its annual assessment examines whether national institutions possess the independence, resources and legal authority required to investigate corruption credibly.
The Commission is also expected to seek stronger safeguards for conflicts of interest, more transparent asset declarations and clearer rules covering the movement of senior officials between government and business.
Madrid has previously promised legislation to regulate lobbying and improve transparency. Progress, however, has been slow, and some proposals have stalled before completing the parliamentary process. The Commission’s latest intervention is therefore likely to focus not only on adopting rules but on making sure that they are effectively enforced.
In Hungary, Brussels is expected to acknowledge significant changes introduced by the country’s new government while insisting that further reforms remain necessary.
Prime Minister Péter Magyar, who replaced Viktor Orbán after elections in April 2026, has pledged to dismantle entrenched networks of political patronage and restore Hungary’s relationship with EU institutions. His government has submitted legislation to establish a National Asset Protection and Recovery Office with powers to trace and recover public money believed to have been misused.
Hungary has also agreed to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, which investigates crimes affecting the EU budget. The move represents a major reversal from the position maintained under Orbán and has been welcomed by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as an additional safeguard for European funds.
Despite those steps, the Commission is expected to demand more detailed lobbying and “revolving door” rules, stronger supervision of officials’ asset declarations and greater operational independence for anti-corruption institutions.
Hungary’s Integrity Authority was created under EU pressure in 2022 to examine suspected misuse of European money. The body has repeatedly argued that it needs stronger investigative powers, including better access to documents and the ability to conduct more effective inspections.
The Magyar government has already proposed tougher penalties for incomplete or false asset declarations and has promised to reinforce the Integrity Authority. Its broader anti-corruption programme is also linked to the release of billions of euros in EU funds previously suspended because of concerns over procurement, judicial independence and conflicts of interest.
In May, the Commission agreed to unlock €16.4 billion in recovery and cohesion funding for Hungary after concluding that the new administration had made substantial progress on required reforms. Some of the money remains dependent on the completion of additional commitments.
The contrast between Madrid and Budapest is politically striking. Spain is governed by an established pro-European administration but has repeatedly failed to complete promised transparency reforms. Hungary, meanwhile, is attempting a rapid institutional break with the Orbán era after years of confrontation with Brussels.
Yet the Commission’s message to both capitals is likely to be similar: political commitments are not enough without enforceable legislation, independent oversight and a demonstrable record of investigating misconduct.
The scrutiny also reflects a broader European effort to harmonise standards against corruption. A new EU directive that entered into force in 2026 introduced stronger common rules for preventing, detecting and prosecuting corruption, while requiring member states to improve accountability and institutional safeguards.
Lobbying is a particular concern because much legitimate interaction between government and business takes place outside public view. Without registers, disclosure obligations and cooling-off periods, citizens may struggle to determine who influenced a decision, whose interests were represented and whether an official stood to benefit personally.
Supporters of stricter rules argue that transparent lobbying does not prevent businesses, trade unions or civil society organisations from engaging with policymakers. Instead, it creates a public record that allows such influence to be examined.
The Commission’s annual recommendations are not, by themselves, legally binding. They can nevertheless carry substantial political and financial weight. Persistent rule-of-law deficiencies may contribute to infringement proceedings, reputational damage or restrictions on access to EU funding.
For Spain, the report will add pressure on the government to turn years of promises into a functioning lobbying regime. For Hungary, it will test whether the political transition under Magyar is producing lasting institutional change rather than a temporary campaign against the previous administration.
Brussels’ central argument is that anti-corruption policy cannot depend on the intentions of whichever government happens to be in office. It must rest on institutions strong enough to scrutinise every administration, regardless of political affiliation.
